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Preface 
 
 
The centenary of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923) was celebrated during 
2002 and its demise eighty years ago has to be recorded in 2003. During the 
centenary various conferences were held, the papers heard at the one at 
STICERD being included in International Studies pamphlet IS/02/432. A further 
conference was held in Tokyo under the auspices of the Japanese Research 
Group on 25-26 May 2002. 
 
Some of the British papers at the conference, two of which were written  by 
members of STICERD, have been revised and extended and now appear with the 
permission of their authors and the conference organizer. They are intended to 
look beyond the narrow diplomatic aspects of the alliance and interpret it from the 
perspectives of media coverage, economics and global international relations. It is 
hoped that the papers will be useful for those who were not fortunate enough to 
attend the conference. 
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Abstracts 
 
 
Daniels examined British media views of Japan by sampling local and national 
dailies, with emphasis on The Times and The Economist and magazines like 
Punch, The Graphic and The Illustrated London News. While the metropolitan 
papers were broadly supportive, some provincial journalists, favouring free trade, 
were critical of Japan and the alliance. 
 
Hunter contrasted Britain's dominance in the international economy in 1902 with 
her weakened position commercially and financially after the first world war. While 
economic factors were a secondary consideration in the formation of the alliance, 
it probably led to the growth of the Japanese economy overall. 
 
Steeds pointed to the contrast that, while the alliance started in the days of the 
Pax Brittanica, it was brought to an end in the days of growing American 
hegemony. After 1905 the United States increasingly looked suspiciously at the 
alliance as a bulwark protecting and encouraging Japan whose wartime activities 
in China and Siberia had antagonized the US. 
 
Nish looked at the Japanese enthusiasm for the alliance in its early stages and 
the disillusion which crept in between her and Britain because of Korea and 
China. When the big decision on continuing the alliance had to be made in 1921, 
it divided opinion in both countries between League of Nations enthusiasts who 
wanted the alliance to end and more pragmatic politicians who were ready for it to 
continue. 
 
 
Keywords: British trade, first world war, British overseas investment, Anglo-
Japanese tariff agreement, Takahashi, Japanese immigration, British Press, 
cartoons, illustrations, trade relations, American hegemony, open door in China, 
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The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the British Press   
Gordon Daniels 
 
The British press – the only significant medium of mass communication in the 
alliance years (1902—1923), was then a very different phenomenon from today. 
Not only were local and provincial newspapers still important commentators on 
national and international events, but the popular daily press was less pictorial, 
more literate and less frivolous than in the early twenty-first century. Consequently 
a comprehensive study of the British press’s treatment of Japan and the alliance 
during two decades would be an enormous undertaking. This brief paper is far 
less ambitious. It is based upon some sampling of local and national dailies and 
magazines, with particular emphasis on The Times and The Economist; and such 
satirical and illustrated magazines as Punch or The London Charivari, The 
Graphic and The Illustrated London News. However, none of these publications 
were mass circulation dailies or weeklies.1 Despite this caveat one can detect 
several major themes and features from such a limited survey. 
 
The first conclusion one might reach is that coverage of Japan was surprisingly 
full across a wide range of publications. One example is the London based 
satirical weekly Punch or The London Charivari. In the years 1903 to 1905 it 
published over thirty major cartoons relating to Japan, while in 1904 the title 
pages of two volumes of Punch were devoted to the Russo-Japanese War.2 In the 
same period issues of The Illustrated London News in which the cover page was 
totally devoted to a Japanese theme or personality were also surprisingly 
numerous.3 Density of coverage was often shaped by particular events – such as 
the Russo-Japanese War, and the Japan-British Exhibition of 1910.4 However it is 
likely that press interest in Japan in these years was not only the spontaneous 
product of the alliance relationship. 
 
Influential government leaders were socially linked to leading figures in major 
newspapers, and domestic issues probably exerted a degree of influence. Interest 
in Japan was in part a by-product of multiple crises in British domestic and 
colonial politics and society: the threat of civil war in Ireland, the conflict between 
the Lords and the Commons, the prolonged guerrilla war in South Africa, the 
deployment of troops in labour disputes, and debates on tariff reform. All 
  
combined to make many aware of real and threatened fissures in the British 
imperial system. Consequently it is understandable that journalists saw Japan as 
a significant model, or object of study. Above all Japan appeared to suggest 
positive gains from government-led social engineering. Furthermore it appeared a 
state in which unity and patriotism were sources of remarkable national 
achievement. 
 
Indeed even before the formal signature of the alliance on 30 January 1902 Ito 
Hirobumi’s visit to Britain produced reactions indicating remarkable enthusiasm for 
Japanese modernization. Of Marquis Ito himself the illustrated weekly The 
Graphic declared: 
'to Ito is due more than to any other living man, that remarkable 
transformation which in the course of a generation has brought Japan 
from the dark ages and placed her socially and politically on an equality 
with the Great Powers of the civilized world. He was really the head and 
brain of the movement which abolished the Chinese Calendar and 
brought about the adoption of European dress, and generally 
substituted Western ideas and modes of life for those of the Chinese.'5 
 
Although the adoption of European dress – particularly by the Japanese elite – 
may appear a relatively superficial aspect of the Meiji achievement, its importance 
in British press coverage was undeniable. In the 1850s and 1860s The Illustrated 
London News had dwelt upon Japanese exotic dress and, at times, near-
nakedness.6 At the beginning of the twentieth century it dwelt upon Japanese in 
Western dress in much of its coverage of Anglo-Japanese events. Not only did 
this include army and navy uniforms but also the dress of British or European high 
society. Events such as Marquis Ito’s reception at the Mansion House provided 
spectacular examples of sartorial Westernization.7 Similarly Punch cartoons often 
represented Japan as a figure in Western military uniform, or Western formal 
dress – on one occasion even the Emperor Meiji was depicted in European style 
military costume.8 
 
Such sartorial and social links between Japanese and British elites were often 
given particular importance by an Imperial or royal dimension. Naval Reviews off 
the English shore, Japanese enthronement ceremonies, Imperial funerals, or the 
visit of Crown Prince Hirohito all suggested common points of reference in the two 
societies – and possibly a growing convergence.9 The merging of diplomacy, 
 
royalty and high society in Anglo-Japanese relations gave them a special public 
aura which, arguably, even the improving relationship with the United States did 
not possess. Emphatically this was a diplomatic world which popular magazines 
could effectively portray; what is more, popular illustrated magazines were 
probably more widely circulated and retained for longer periods than less 
physically attractive daily newspapers. 
 
If royal, imperial and high society links provided one public dimension of the 
alliance, another was a tendency to demonstrate the two societies’ sharing of 
skills, problems and challenges. Clearly the notion of shared pride in naval power 
– and of shared admiration of the Nelson touch were present in Naval Reviews 
and visits by Japanese warships.10 In the early years of the alliance the concept of 
a shared antipathy to Czarist expansionism was also spread in cartoons and 
suitably captioned photographs.11 A further common element in the two societies 
was suggested by a depiction of the feminist Seitō society in The Illustrated 
London News, at a time when the movement for female advancement was 
significant in British politics.12 
 
A further bond which the press suggested was that of Japan as a specific model 
in military matters. In July 1904 the patriotic cartoonist Bernard Partridge depicted 
John Bull – commenting to a kimono clad Japanese woman who was viewing a 
map of North East Asia 'your army system seems to work splendidly'. To which 
the Japanese replied 'Every man is ready to sacrifice himself for his country and 
does it'. John Bull’s reflective response was 'I must try to introduce that at home'.13 
In line with this suggestion of common patriotic ideals was the use of Japanese 
traits to ridicule British left wing pacifism. In July 1910 the Labour leader Keir 
Hardie had suggested that, on retiring from politics, he would like to retire to a 
rural village in Japan. In response a Punch cartoonist,  E. T. Reed, depicted 
Hardie in geta and hachimaki as the 'Professor of Anti-Jujitsu' – or the 'noble art of 
lying down' – the absolute opposite of patriotic Bushido.14 
 
Clearly, newspapers and serious weeklies provided accounts and analyses which 
were of greater complexity than anything which appeared in satirical or illustrated 
magazines. What is more serious newspapers and magazines presented a mixed 
response to the signing of the alliance in 1902. Perhaps a small paper in the North 
  
Wales seaside resort of Rhyl – The Rhyl Record and Advertiser  - typifies some 
provincial liberal responses to the agreement. In a leading article it declared: 
 
'We all admire that gallant and progressive country which has known 
how to raise itself in a generation from a retrograde medieval empire to 
the status of a great power with a formidable army, a liberal constitution 
and systems of law and education which in some respects surpass 
those of any European power – but the conclusion of a treaty of this 
kind is very much more than a merely sentimental question. We have 
bound ourselves to the fortunes of a power whose interests are very far 
from being ours.'15 
 
The London Economist – at that time a less political journal than now – 
condemned the alliance on quite different grounds. Perhaps being most 
concerned with the maintenance of open trading among European states, and 
perhaps recalling the international expedition against the Boxers in 1901, it 
declared: 
'Great Britain has quit decidedly ... that unwritten alliance of all white 
Powers against all coloured races and through which alone the 
supremacy of Europe over Asia and Africa can finally be established.' 
It concluded: 
'The alliance is described as a grand stroke in Asiatic politics ... but the 
more we reflect upon its consequences the more inclined we feel to 
wish it had not been struck. The wisest clause in the Treaty is that 
which limits its operation to five years.'16 
 
Pursuing a similar theme a British ex-employee of the Japanese Government was 
given space in The Manchester Guardian to condemn the alliance for linking a 
super power to a country of markedly inferior status. 
 
In contrast The Times appears to have been a newspaper which, being close to 
government circles, consistently championed Japan and the alliance – whatever 
the circumstances. The Times’ commitment to Japan was most obvious at the 
time of the 1910 Japan-British exhibition when it published a voluminous 
supplement surveying many aspects of Japanese civilization.17 But such 
supplements may have been less influential than numerous editorials which used 
all possible ingenuity to justify Japanese actions. One major example was The 
Times’ response to the Japanese annexation of Korea. Despite some ambiguous 
reservations it noted that annexation was 'the only sound solution of the many 
  
difficulties which have arisen'. It continued, in a vein reflecting the notion of 
common imperial experience, 'it would ill become the nation which still reluctantly 
keeps the ex-King of Upper Burma a prisoner in a small town upon the West coast 
of India to offer any opposition'.18 A further example of The Times’ complex 
sympathy for Japan was its treatment of the suicide of General Nogi in September 
1912 – which coincided with the beginning of the Emperor Meiji’s funeral. Its 
leading article 'Morals in East and West' concluded 'although there is a great 
difference in conduct between East and West yet there is not the same difference 
in moral values. Both value freedom of the spirit and the courage which secures 
it'.19 
 
Another earlier occasion in 1912 when The Times led what seems to have been a 
semi-official response to an event in Japan, was following the death of the 
Emperor Meiji. At this time The Times’ leader writer admitted no flaw in the 
Emperor’s character and saw only a bright and ethical future for Japan. This 
leading article affirmed that the Emperor Meiji had 'a compassion for suffering, 
and a realization of the privations of his troops in the field which can have only 
sprung from a nature touched with true nobility'. Despite lamenting the Emperor’s 
death the author concluded 'Under his successor the Japanese Empire will pursue 
to high destinies, ... faithful to its friends, determined to maintain the place it has 
won for itself, but slow to commit aggression'.20 
 
The events of the First World War turned British press attention from Japan to 
continental Europe and the Middle East. However Japanese naval support in the 
Mediterranean and medical support from Japanese Red Cross nurses received 
significant attention in articles and photographs.21 Yet it was Japanese actions, 
only loosely connected with the war, which precipitated most comment and 
controversy. The so-called Twenty One Demands which Japan issued to China in 
January 1915 split opinion between the quasi-official Times and the more 
commercially concerned Economist. In numerous articles The Times questioned 
the veracity of reports of the Japanese demands, claiming that Chinese 
statements were usually unreliable, and were designed to create diplomatic 
mischief.22 German mischief making was seen as another possible explanation for 
possibly dubious stories. Despite these doubts The Times concluded: 
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'We hope that the statesmen of our allies will be careful to avoid giving 
any reasonable ground for a suspicion so injurious to the fame and to 
the future prospects of their country. We expect that even now ... they 
will exert their high abilities to avert a catastrophe, and to justify once 
again British confidence in Japan and British sympathy with all 
legitimate development and expansion of her interests in the Far 
East.'23 
 
In contrast The Economist, perhaps more concerned with conditions of trade 
eventually criticized Japanese actions more directly stating 'Japan cannot afford 
either the cost or the discredit of creating by military aggression fresh chaos in 
China'.24 
 
By late 1917, despite Japan’s military support against the Central Powers, The 
Economist was expressing clear disquiet at Japanese commercial policies, which 
appeared less open than those of Britain. Referring to an article in the Japanese 
magazines Taiyo, by a banker named Hayakawa, it commented 'This little lecture 
coming from a Japanese is truly remarkable. In India a Japanese has the same 
rights as a British subject'.25 In contrast it noted that no parallel freedoms were 
available to British subjects in Japanese possessions. In fact by the closing 
months of the Great War The Economist was questioning far more than the 
openness of Japanese trade policies. Reflecting on the profits which Japan had 
legitimately made from wartime conditions it declared: 
 
'... it is not good for any nation to make great profits out of war. The 
large indemnity received by Japan as the result of her war with China ... 
gave a decided impetus to militarism ... It made Japan more ready to go 
to war with Russia.'26 
 
Seeking to condemn the notion that war was financially profitable the article 
concluded 'With some of Japan’s leading publicists we may hope that the doctrine 
has never gained sufficient strength in this country to involve it in such a 
catastrophe as has befallen Europe'.27 In fact the choice which existed for Japan 
between socio-economic progress and military prowess was one which The 
Economist articulated on several occasions. 
 
  
Nevertheless despite the changing war situation Punch cartoonists continued to 
hail Japan as an extremely valuable ally. In August 1918 the rising sun – clearly 
identified as Japan – was shown as a cleansing light, driving a Bolshevik to flee.28 
Another cartoon showed Japan as a barrier to a German advance towards Siberia 
and Vladivostok.29 At much the same time The Times commented favourably: 
 
'The Japanese have decided to dispatch troops to Siberia, if indeed 
their forces are not already on the way. The step, it need hardly be said, 
has been taken in consultation with the Allies and with the United States 
and has their warmest sympathy ... she is the only power able to act in 
force with the necessary promptitude.'30 
 
With the end of war conditions and the approach of the Washington Conference 
the British press appeared to coalesce in supporting a new diplomatic system in 
the Pacific region. This concept apparently attracted previous ‘dissenters’ and 
supporters of government policies. Following the signing of the Washington 
agreements Punch hailed the United States as the chef of a new peaceful Pacific 
pudding.31 The Economist also approved the four power pact, writing: 
'To many publicists on the Continent and in Great Britain, Japan has 
seemed bent on controlling and exploiting China at once, and all Asia 
by and by. To American and Australasian observers she has seemed 
eager to flood America and Australasia with her immigrants, and to 
have an eye on the Philippines and other Pacific islands as stepping 
stones. A German Professor has denounced Great Britain as betraying 
the white races by preparing to use the Japanese army for her own 
ends in the Far East and India, and in return to allow Japan to gain a 
foothold in China which would ultimately facilitate British ruin. These 
suspicions, or some of them, might conceivably be justified if Japan 
were entirely controlled by her militant prophets of expansion. The best 
proof that she repudiates their policy is her acceptance of the 
substitution of three Powers for one in a pact blocking a policy of 
expansion. The Alliance has been beneficial in some respects, but of 
late it has been a cause of friction, owing to the interpretation placed 
upon it in America and elsewhere. Its supercession by the new and 
wider Pact – into which both parties enter in company with the United 
States and France is one of the most hopeful symptoms of world 
politics.'32 
 
To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the British media in the Alliance 
years it would be necessary to know much more of provincial newspaper opinion, 
and the links between British leaders, Japanese leaders and the London press. 
But on the basis of this limited survey one may argue that in formal or informal 
  
ways Anglo-Japanese elites shaped much of the metropolitan press to support 
Japan and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In contrast many provincial and some 
metropolitan journalists favoured free trade and Little Englandism. Consequently 
these writers made cogent criticisms of Japan and the Alliance. Nevertheless the 
Alliance years were perhaps a golden age of reporting and comment regarding 
Japan. The journalism of the years 1902 to 1923 may have exhibited complex 
biases and failings of judgement but worse was to follow. As the popular press 
increasingly became a vehicle of sensation and entertainment, press interest in 
Japan often shrunk to little more than floods, earthquakes and other natural 
disasters.33 Profit became an even more powerful driving force in the development 
of popular journalism. 
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 THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
Janet Hunter 
 
The years of the alliance spanned a watershed in the relative economic strengths 
of the two countries. While Britain’s industrial supremacy was increasingly 
challenged by both Germany and the United States prior to 1914, Britain 
remained dominant in the international economy, accounting for the largest share 
of world trade and serving as the pivot of the international payments system. 
Japan was no more than a bit-part player, an economy still in the early stages of 
industrialisation as yet unable to claim a high profile in the international economy. 
The disruption consequent on the First World War undermined the established 
position of British manufacturers and exporters, and brought to an end the gold 
standard regime that had sustained London’s position as the undisputed centre of 
the world’s financial dealings. It offered Japan the opportunity not only of 
increasing her production, but also of enhancing her position in a changed 
international economic order more and more dominated by the United States. 
However, many of the wartime gains were not sustained. In many respects the 
Japanese economy remained internationally weak, and Japan throughout the 
period of the alliance was constantly engaged in a fight to secure what she 
considered to be her legitimate place in the international economy, particularly in 
Asia. 
 
It is clear that in the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 
commercial and financial considerations were for both countries at most a 
secondary consideration.1   
 
Nevertheless, the nature of the international economy was integral to the 
international order and the global balance of power, and neither Britain nor Japan 
could remain unaffected by the growing globalisation of economic interaction and 
the nature of their own integration into the global economy. This was a period in 
which commodities, money and people increasingly transcended national 
boundaries, enhancing the scope for both cooperation and conflict. The aim of this 
short paper is to identify some of the economic issues that had a specific bearing 
 on the existence and continuation of the alliance, but which also characterised 
broader trends in the international economy. 
 
Movement of Goods 
World trade was expanding rapidly in the years up to the First World War. 
Between 1870 and 1913 world exports were growing at an estimated 3.4% per 
year. Export growth in Britain was 2.8% per year over the same period, while that 
of Japan was 8.5%.2  However, while Japan was able to draw considerable 
benefits from the British-dominated international trading and financial order, even 
in 1913 Japan’s share of world trade remained very small by comparison with that 
of Britain. The pattern of commodity trade was not a consideration when the 
alliance was initially concluded in 1902, or when it was revised in 1905, but 
renewal of the agreement in 1911 was closely tied to discussions over Japanese 
tariff reform and the conclusion of a new commercial treaty to replace the one that 
had been concluded between the two countries in 1894. The tariff issue was an 
acrimonious one, and generated a considerable element of anti-Japanese 
sentiment both among the British mercantile community in Japan and within some 
sectors of British industry. Under the 1894 treaty tariffs on imports into Japan from 
the Western powers had continued to be fixed at a low rate. Japan announced her 
intention of abrogating the existing tariff agreement in February 1909. The initial 
proposals for a bilateral tariff agreement that followed were thought to be likely to 
raise tariffs on British goods by up to 500%.3  Aware of British concerns, the 
Japanese side sought to be conciliatory, but were determined for both economic 
and political reasons to assert their right to tariff autonomy. 
 
The tariff issue raised fears that it might jeopardise a new alliance, but tariff levels 
were also at the core of debates on the development of the world’s commodity 
trade, embodying the conflict between the advocates of free trade and protection. 
Britain, which had been a strong advocate of free trade since the repeal of the 
Corn Laws, found the doctrine coming under increasing pressure from British 
manufacturers who feared losing domestic markets to more competitive foreign 
producers. The use of protection by Britain’s major competitors, including 
Germany and the United States, deprived Britain of the benefits that might accrue 
from mutual free trade, and the chance of reciprocity in bilateral trade dealings. At 
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the time of the tariff revision negotiations with Japan, these domestic debates had 
become increasingly passionate, and the Japanese tariff issue was for some 
protagonists a symbol of the problems of a continuing free trade regime. Speaking 
in favour of protection at Manchester’s Free Trade Hall in November 1910, 
Andrew Bonar Law, later cabinet minister and conservative prime minister, 
pointed to Japan as evidence of Britain’s need to shift her policy. Firstly, he 
argued, the existence of free trade was an impediment to reciprocal negotiations. 
The proposed new tariffs in Japan were likely to have serious implications for 
British trade, but despite the close relations between the two countries ‘the 
Japanese Minister said openly in the Japanese Parliament – and in existing 
circumstances how can we blame him? – that though Japan was prepared to 
make special treaties with other countries she could make no such treaty with us, 
because as we are a ‘Free’ Trade country there was nothing we could give in 
exchange’. In a prescient warning of the future, he also drew attention to the 
potential benefits of introducing a system of tariffs associated with imperial 
preference: 
 
‘Japan is creating very slowly, and any one who looks into the figures will 
see, very surely, a great cotton trade, and any one who realises the power 
of the organisation of the Japanese people, who recognises the unlimited 
supply of labour, which we cannot compete with, must admit – it might be in 
five, ten, or twenty years – we shall have on the Indian market from Japan 
a competition which is bound to be serious, and which may become deadly.                   
Give India preference in our market, and you make it her interest as much 
as ours to be assured in all time to come that foreign competition will not be 
a danger to us.’4 
 
While the foundation for a return to protection in Britain was not laid until the 
introduction of the wartime McKenna duties in 1915, the tariff issue even at this 
time symbolised the growing acknowledgement within Britain itself that its 
international economic dominance was increasingly under threat and existing 
policies had to change 
 
For the Japanese, tariff autonomy and the ability to protect domestic industry was 
not just a political desideratum, but an economic imperative. While some 
Japanese manufacturing sectors had managed to survive and even grow in the 
absence of tariff barriers dictated by the unequal treaties, the principle of using 
tariffs not just for revenue purposes but for the development of the national 
economy had been well established by countries such as Germany. Tariffs and 
other forms of protection were increasingly seen as a means of protecting 
vulnerable infant industries, and tariffs were to be skilfully used by Japan in the 
years after 1911 as a weapon to help protect uncompetitive industries, as well as 
to sustain supplies of essential imports and restrict those deemed less necessary, 
including luxury goods. The tariff issue was integral to the desire of less 
industrialised economies to protect their interests in the face of domination of the 
international economy by the more industrialised ones, particularly Britain. The 
growth of tariffs also heralded further moves down the more protectionist and 
autarkic road that characterised the international economy by the time the alliance 
ended, and accelerated thereafter. 
 
Movement of Capital 
In the 1890s and 1900s significant amounts of capital found their way from more 
industrialised to less industrialised economies. For Japan the door to the 
acquisition of foreign capital, something that had been largely avoided up to the 
turn of the century, was opened by Japan’s accession to the gold standard in 
1897. For potential lenders to Japan, tying the yen to gold meant greater financial 
credibility and reserves making loans more likely to be repaid. The period of the 
alliance was characterised by the Japanese government’s raising loans on the 
London market, and also by other forms of borrowing, notably by municipalities 
and local governments, agencies such as port authorities, and public utilities. 
Overall, though, the extent of the capital flow from Britain to Japan remained 
limited.  In 1914 Britain accounted for 43% of all foreign investment, but almost all 
of it went to the United States, Latin America, the British Dominions and colonies 
such as India. Only a minute part, 1-2.5% at most, reached non-empire territories 
such as Japan.5  Japanese government loan issues during the years 1900-13 
amounted to just over £65 million (c.¥650 million), around 20% of all foreign 
government loan issues in London over this period, but there was no further 
government borrowing in London over the remainder of the alliance years.6 
Municipal loans from 1902 up the First World War totalled just over ¥177 million, 
and a further ¥200 million was raised for Japanese companies. Two-thirds of the 
company loans went to the South Manchurian Railway, and the Oriental 
 Development Company (Tōyō Takushoku), a government-supported 
developmental agency in Korea, borrowed ¥20 million.7  Bodies of this kind 
continued to attract money from overseas in the 1920s, notwithstanding the 
Japanese government’s attempts at monetary restraint, but it was not until 1923 
that private corporations, including the South Manchurian Railway, returned to 
raising money overseas. Municipal borrowing, for earthquake reconstruction, 
resumed only from 1926.8 
 
Ian Nish has noted that in the early years of the alliance its existence may well 
have facilitated the procuring of capital from Britain. Japan’s enhanced status in 
1902 reflected well on its creditworthiness, but there was no automatic surge in 
foreign borrowing.9 It is also evident that for Japanese borrowers, including the 
government, raising money in London was not easy.10  When Takahashi Korekiyo 
was sent to London in 1905 to negotiate government loans, initial circumstances 
did not give rise to optimism about Japan’s ability to obtain money on favourable 
terms. It is clear from Takahashi’s diary (written in English) that in loan 
negotiations with British bankers what was really important was general 
confidence in the financial status of the Japanese government and the fluctuating 
course of the war. The day to day price of Japanese bonds in London or New 
York was far more influenced by the likelihood of Port Arthur’s falling to the 
Japanese or the Russian Baltic Fleet’s unfortunate attack on trawlers from Hull, 
although the existence of the alliance clearly served to generate goodwill. In his 
diary entry for April 13th, Takahashi noted concerns over the Japanese 
government’s ability to maintain the gold standard, commenting ‘the people in 
heart think the Russians will be the final victor in the war. This scares the people 
for Japanese bonds’.11  With the British government unwilling to intervene to put 
pressure on financial circles regarding the terms of a second loan later the same 
year, Takahashi noted on September 13th the advice of the banker, A.A.Shand, 
that ‘no body can make market, but submit and go in’.12  Financial authorities 
remained concerned that Japan was borrowing beyond its means, and this 
contributed to Japan’s limited involvement in the enormous flow of capital out of 
London. Even before the First World War, moreover, French financiers were 
gradually undermining Britain’s dominance of the loan issue business, and it is 
apparent that after the war it was the US that became the important player, 
 reflecting the growing importance of the United States in global capital flows. 
Efforts to promote greater portfolio investment appear also to have been hindered 
by the Japanese government’s desire to retain control over investment flows 
through the Industrial Bank of Japan, the speculative nature of some of the 
attempts to promote the use of British capital by enterprises in Japan, and general 
concern over the riskiness of such investments.13 
 
This concern over risk applied even more to direct investment and the activities of 
British business in Japan. While the end of extraterritoriality in 1899 paved the 
way for more foreign business activity in the country, legal impediments remained, 
including restrictions or prohibitions on foreign involvement in activities such as 
financial exchanges, insurance, mining and coastal trade.14  British multinationals 
were active in Japan in a range of industries – engineering, steelmaking, rubber 
production, and thread manufacture – and in production worked mainly through 
joint ventures with Japanese counterparts to found foreign affiliates. Many British 
firms, particularly in commerce, established branch offices in Japan. British firms 
played a key role in the carrying trade to Japan. However, the existence of the 
alliance gave British firms no predominant position among foreign business in 
Japan. Of the foreign-affiliated manufacturing companies established during the 
period of the alliance (1902-1923) only five were linked with a British company, as 
compared  to seven with a US corporation, four with Germany and one with 
France.15  By the mid 1920s the US was clearly a greater presence in Japanese 
manufacturing than Britain, although in trading Britain remained of importance. 
One estimate in 1931 cited 21 major cases of British direct investment in Japan, 
as opposed to 36 for the United States.16  Much of the carrying trade was wrested 
from British hands by Japanese firms during the 1914-18 conflict. 
 
Even so, it may be suggested that the existence of the formal link offered by the 
alliance may at least early on have been an agent in Japan’s increasing 
involvement in international capital flows. It supported the Japanese government 
loan issues required for the Russo-Japanese War, and the substantial flow of 
funds into the South Manchurian Railway took place under the auspices of the 
British government. Government leadership is also likely to have encouraged the 
raising of money overseas by other bodies. The considerable sums raised for 
 infrastructure and utility investment by Japanese municipalities helped to 
compensate for the shortage of capital that hindered such investment, particularly 
in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, the existence of the 
alliance was also a prerequisite for Japan’s positive response to Britain’s need for 
additional funds during the Great War. As part of her lending to the allies, Japan 
loaned over ¥283 million to Britain between 1916 and 1919 through the medium of 
both treasury bills and exchequer bonds.  All the loans had been repaid by 
January 1921.17 
 
Movement of People 
The late nineteenth-early twentieth century was characterised by an acceleration 
of international migration, within regions and between continents, a process 
facilitated by the growth of steamships and improved means of long distance 
communication and information flow. Much of the migration consisted of 
individuals leaving the nations of Europe, particularly Britain, most of them 
destined for the countries of northern and southern America. A much smaller 
number headed for the Australia and New Zealand, and Britain’s other Empire 
territories. Japan became a major participant in Asiatic migration. Over half a 
million Japanese left Japan between 1885 and 1907, and a further 643,000 
between 1908 and 1924. Major destinations were Hawaii and the United States, 
but over time Korea and Asiatic Russia became more important, while others went 
to China, Brazil and Peru.18  Many went initially as indentured labourers, and then 
remained, while others were attracted by the prospects of business opportunities, 
underpopulated territories, and streets said to be paved with gold. 
 
The issue of Japanese migration became an important one for the predominantly 
white dominions of the British Empire, and put the alliance under some strain. 
Australia had adhered strongly to an all-white immigration policy, but after the 
conclusion of the 1894 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation the prospects for 
trade with Japan increased, and there was pressure for closer commercial ties 
and a better knowledge of Asia. On the conclusion of the alliance in 1902 the 
government, headed by Edmund Barton, suggested that it offered substantial 
commercial benefits to Australia, as well as protection for the northern parts of the 
Commonwealth. There were even sporadic advocates for Japanese and Asian 
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settlement of its northern territories during the alliance period. These views, 
however, conflicted with the nationalist vision of Australia as a model white 
democracy and recurrent fears of an Asian invasion, and ultimately the emphasis 
on a white Australia took precedence over the promotion of international 
commerce.19 
 
The tensions between dominion fears over Japanese immigration and the alliance 
emphasis on preserving good relations with Japan became particularly prominent 
in the case of Canada. By 1900 there were close on 5,000 Japanese in British 
Columbia. Fuelled by an exodus from Hawaii and the demand for low cost labour, 
particularly for railway construction, between 1900 and 1915 around 16,000 
Japanese were admitted to Canada, over 80% of them settling in British 
Columbia, though many did not remain there permanently.20  Japanese residents 
rapidly came in for criticism. Japanese fishermen, for example, were accused of 
undercutting their white counterparts.  Even those who became naturalised 
Canadian citizens faced discrimination and disenfranchisement under local 
legislation, and objections were raised to Japanese immigrants becoming 
Canadian citizens.21 Local tensions erupted in 1907 in rioting in Vancouver. The 
dominion government was caught between local anti-immigration sentiment and 
the pressure to maintain goodwill between the Empire and Japan coming from 
Britain and articulated in the alliance. Canada had on its own initiative adhered to 
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894, which provided for the entry of 
Japanese nationals, and to abrogate that treaty would have meant losing a 
lucrative trading partner. The issue was resolved, as in the case of California 
around the same time, through the reaching of a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’, 
whereby Japan agreed voluntarily to limit the number of migrants going directly 
from Japan to Canada, a quota that was further reduced in 1922.22 
 
From the turn of the century the Empire was of growing importance in economic 
relations between Britain and Japan. Dominion concern with potential and actual 
Japanese immigration persisted through the early twentieth century, and was 
increasingly fed into discussions on the continuation of the alliance during the 
years of the First World War. It was a major element in the existence of a general 
 hostility towards Japan in the British Empire, which caused many to question 
whether the alliance should be continued.23 
 
International Activities of Merchants and Firms 
Much of the economic interaction between Britain and Japan in the period of the 
alliance came in the form of competition in third countries as the nationals and 
agents of each country jostled for position in newly opened and expanding 
markets.  British merchants had long been active across the global economy, and 
Britain had spearheaded Western economic penetration of China from the 1840s. 
Japanese commercial involvement in Asia had a long history, but the scale of 
Japan’s international mercantile activity increased dramatically in the late 
nineteenth century. Even before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 Japanese 
commercial activity in parts of the Asian mainland was conspicuous, and it spread 
quickly from Korea into Manchuria and other parts of China. The Open Door 
Policy first articulated in 1899 in the context of a scramble for concessions 
provided for the powers to have equal commercial opportunities in China, but 
during the period of the alliance Manchuria became a breeding ground for hostility 
between Japanese and British commercial interest, a hostility that drew in the 
governments of the two countries. 
 
The terms of the alliance appeared to offer support for a strengthening of Japan’s 
commercial position in Northeast Asia. The 1902 and 1905 agreements both 
acknowledged the predominance of Japanese interests in Korea. The nature of 
this acknowledgement, in which ‘interests’ were widely interpreted, differed from 
the reference to British India in the 1905 agreement, which stemmed from 
strategic considerations. The existence of these provisions, one writer has argued, 
weakened the global link between Europe and Asia, giving Japan a freer hand in 
the East Asian region.24  This greater freedom to act was accentuated by the war 
of 1914-18, which preoccupied the attention of Britain and the other powers, and 
was exploited by Japan, as shown, for example, in the issuing of the Twenty-One 
Demands to China in January 1915. 
 
Commercial tensions in Manchuria were apparent well before war broke out in 
Europe in 1914. Notwithstanding the British government’s willingness to 
 guarantee considerable funds for the development of the South Manchurian 
Railway, there were ongoing disputes about other railways, notably the line 
between Beijing and Mukden, and proposals to build routes running parallel to the 
SMR. In November 1907, the regime in China concluded an agreement with a 
British firm to build a line between Hsinmintun and Fakumen, which would have 
had the effect of channelling to the Chinese port of Tianjin some of the goods 
currently flowing through Japanese-controlled Dairen in Manchuria. The Japanese 
protested vigorously on the grounds of a secret protocol in a 1905 Chinese-
Japanese agreement. The British response, according to one German academic 
writing in the early 1920s, was a distinctly weak one, and even British merchants 
in the area fell in behind acquiescence to Japan’s demands, albeit at a cost to 
their personal profit. ‘Japan knew that the limits of her freedom of action in 
Manchuria were very broad, for England had at the time other important things to 
consider.’25  Railways continued to be a source of discord, notably in 1911 when 
Japan requested Britain to agree to Japanese control of the Beijing-Mukden line 
after the start of the Revolution.26 
 
Discontent at Japan’s apparent disregard for the interests of other nationals, and 
of the Open Door Policy in general, went far beyond concern over railway 
strategy. Western merchants operated in Manchuria under tight restrictions, 
disadvantaged by preferential railway rates and customs exemptions for their 
Japanese competitors. Evidence was gathered that Japan was seeking to achieve 
a monopoly on trade. Japanese merchants in Manchuria were said to ‘possess a 
formidable advantage over British competitors’.27 The Twenty-One Demands 
further strengthened Japanese economic interests in both Manchuria and the rest 
of China, and there was growing concern that Japan was pushing her interests in 
the Yangzi area long dominated by Britain.28 Few Britons would have been 
prepared to accede to the view expressed by the British socialist H.M.Hyndman 
that new policies were needed to acknowledge Asian rights and equality, but they 
might well have recognised his argument that the position of Britain and the other 
powers in Asia was being steadily undermined.29  The alliance, by acknowledging 
the existence of Japanese rights in mainland northeast Asia not only helped 
Japan to extend those interests, but confirmed the growing unwillingness and 
inability of Britain to sustain her pre-eminent position in the global economy in the 
 face of competitors not just in Europe and North America, but in Asia as well. The 
situation was summed up by one writer in 1912: 
 
‘Many prominent Englishmen living in the Far East hold the opinion that 
British prestige, not only in China but also in other Oriental countries, has 
declined in a marked degree since the close of the Russo-Japanese war.  
Whatever view may be entertained on this aspect of the question there can 
be no doubt that in consequence of the interpretation placed by the Foreign 
Office upon the obligations of the Alliance, the commercial interests of 
Great Britain have not advanced to the extent that was anticipated both at 
the time when the provisions of the Alliance were disclosed, and, in a still 
more confident degree, when the first-fruits of the Alliance were realised.’30 
 
By the end of the 1914-18 war opinion among the British community in China was 
distinctly unhappy with Japanese economic policy in the region, and this impacted 
on its view of the benefits of the alliance. ‘From every point of view the Alliance 
has served Japan admirably and it is fair to say that she has obtained her present 
position among the Powers of the world very largely through its instrumentality’, 
wrote one businessman, but Japanese designs in China were clearly incompatible 
with the conditions of the alliance. ‘Japan, to put it plainly, has been taking 
advantage of us behind our backs, and for this reason there has grown up among 
British residents in China, who have seen at close quarters what the Japanese 
were doing, the feeling that the Alliance had ceased to serve any useful purpose 
and might as well be ended.’31 Unlike their Japanese counterparts, British 
merchants in China were among the most vocal critics of the Alliance.32 The 
extent to which this strand of opinion carried weight with British policymakers is, 
however, debateable. It certainly did not bring to a halt further British investment 
in Japanese development in Manchuria.   
 
Conclusion  
The period of the duration of the alliance was one of the increasing international 
movement of goods, capital and labour. In both Britain and Japan firms were 
increasingly involved in international activity. In short, there was an ongoing 
process of economic globalisation. This process had ramifications that went far 
beyond the balance of economic power between the two individual countries. 
These international economic trends were more than just a backdrop to the 
operation of the alliance. On the one hand, the alliance’s existence had the 
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potential to promote greater mobility within the international economic system, 
facilitating and encouraging certain flows of capital and patterns of trade. On the 
other, shifts in the movement of goods, capital and labour influenced debates over 
the continuation and scope of the alliance, in some cases generating frictions that 
caused many to question whether it should continue.   
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  The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and American Hegemony 
David Steeds 
 
 
The concept of hegemony is much used, and indeed abused, at the present time. 
What do we mean by it? The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary speaks of 
'leadership' and the 'predominance of one state of a confederacy'. This may have 
been so in ancient Greece, from where the word originates, but modern usage 
goes beyond this. Hegemony today is still about leadership and predominance, 
but it is also about domination, laying down the rules, the standards, the values for 
a region or for the globe. It can be about imperialism, although not necessarily of 
the territorial kind. 
 
The current global hegemonic power is the United States. An article in a recent 
issue of the Beijing Review gives the Chinese view: ‘The United States has 
become the sole world superpower since the end of the Cold War.  Its recent anti-
terrorism campaign has in fact strengthened its standing as such. Many U.S. 
strategists are now devising a method of imposing the will of the "New Rome" on 
the world so as to maintain U.S. hegemony.’1 
 
American scholars, while accepting the notion of United States hegemony, argue 
that it is rather different from other examples from the recent past. G. John 
Ikenberry, in an article in 2001, argued that, ‘The United States is indeed a global 
hegemon, but because of its democratic institutions and political traditions it is - or 
can be - a relatively benign one.’2  Peter Van Ness looks at it from a different 
perspective: ‘The United States today dominates the globe and many regional 
geographical subsystems in an unprecedented way, maintaining a hegemonic 
order that is in no way similar to the "anarchy" assumed in realist analyses. The 
global system today is not simply unipolar; it is a hegemonic system that is 
increasingly globalised the U.S. hegemonic system.’3 
 
The Chinese and American perspectives on what form American hegemony takes 
may differ, but there is agreement that the United States is the hegemonic power 
of the day. How did it happen?  More important for this paper, when did it 
happen? Was it happening during the years 1902 to 1923, the period of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance? If it was, what effect if any did it have on the Alliance? 
 
The Formation of American Hegemony  
It can be argued that the roots of American hegemony go right back to the 
Founding Fathers and the Declaration of Independence. There were positive 
signs in the way the United States viewed developments in Central and South 
America in the early years of the Nineteenth Century.  And in the 1830s, an acute 
observer like Alexis de Tocqueville could comment that Americans ‘daily quit the 
spots which gave them birth to acquire extensive domains in a remote region’ (he 
was referring to the West), and he went on, ‘The Americans are destined by 
nature to be a great maritime people. They will become, like the English, the 
commercial agents of a great portion of the world’.4 
 
By the 1850s, the West was on the way to being won, and the perspective was 
becoming broader. Beyond the West was the Pacific and beyond the Pacific was 
Asia. The American approach was influenced by a mix of factors which were to 
recur again and again in the next one hundred and fifty years: high moral 
endeavour, personified in the Nineteenth Century by missionary activity, the 
development of trade and commerce, the spirit of adventure, and the first signs of 
imperialism. The Pacific-Asia region provided plenty of opportunities. In the case 
of China, the Americans initially appeared to be willing to follow in the footsteps of 
the British, victors in three opium wars.  In the case of Japan, the United States 
took the lead, in the persons of Commodore Perry and the diplomat, Townsend 
Harris. 
 
United States interest and activity in the Pacific-Asia region picked up after the 
ending of the Civil War in 1865, and following the Alaska Purchase in 1867.  An 
early attempt to provide leadership, and arguably an unsuccessful one, was made 
by Anson Burlingame in China in the 1860s. More effective in promoting American 
interests and strengthening the American position was the acquisition or 
occupation of a succession of islands in the Pacific: Johnston Island 1858, 
Midway 1867, Samoa 1889, Guam 1898, Hawaii1898, the Philippines 1898, and 
Wake 1899. Opinion in the United States, whether official or public, did not of 
 course see this as imperialism, following the British, French or Russian examples, 
but to a detached observer it looked rather like it.   
 
Apart from a preoccupation with the Americas, the main focus of United States 
attention by the end of the Nineteenth Century was the Pacific-Asia region. There 
was trouble with Japan regarding the take-over of Hawaii, the liberation of the 
Philippines (at least to begin with!) from Spanish imperialism, concern about the 
Scramble for Concessions in China, and the attempts by the Secretary of State, 
John Hay, to uphold the principle of the Open Door in China. 
 
The main driving forces behind American policy have links with the 1850s, and 
reach forward to the 1930s and beyond. They include the insistence on the 
freedom of the seas and the need for a strong naval presence, the importance of 
trade with the need for an Open Door in China, hostility to the imperialist 
ambitions of the European States with the search for commercial and territorial 
concessions and spheres of influence, and continuing support for missionary 
activity in the broadest sense, including medical and educational work. In addition, 
you have the beginnings of something akin to a special relationship with China, 
which reaches maturity in the 1930s.  It all adds up to what might be called the 
first steps in the formation of an American hegemonic approach to the region, 
although anything like a finished product was still some way off, and was not 
available until the Washington settlement of 1921-1922.  
 
The period between 1900 and 1914 can be described as a frustrating one for 
United States policy-makers in the Pacific-Asia region. Whatever ideas and 
ambitions the United States had, it remained what might be called a second 
division player in the international political game.  The first division players were, 
in alphabetical order, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom. The Americans 
could do little but watch and accept the four key events which transformed the 
international politics of the region: the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905, 
and the diplomatic revolution of 1907 which brought France, Japan, Russia and 
the United Kingdom together. The more realistic American policy-makers, like 
Theodore Roosevelt, accepted this, worked within the system and were able to 
 play positive roles, as in 1905 over the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth. 
The less realistic players, such as Taft, Knox, Harriman and Straight, tried to 
challenge the system, as in Manchuria from 1908, and failed.  
 
Two major issues were of increasing concern to the United States in this period, 
and were to affect the American view of the Alliance, and American policy in the 
region until after the Second World War. The first was the souring of relations with 
Japan. There were many reasons for this, including immigration, discrimination in 
California, naval rivalry, a possible threat to the Philippines , and Japanese policy 
towards China in general and Manchuria in particular. The second, which also had 
implications for the Alliance, was the American view of what was happening in 
China, particularly after the revolution of 1911-12. It was a matter of concern and 
frustration to the United States that the major outside influences on what was 
happening in China came from Japan and the United Kingdom. 
 
The climax of this first stage in the formation of American hegemony came with 
the presidency from 1912 to 1920 of Woodrow Wilson. American policy-makers 
were able to take advantage of World War One to promote American ideas and 
leadership on a global scale. The Fourteen Points, the attacks on ‘old diplomacy’ 
and the part played at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, demonstrated the 
new role and importance of the United States. 
 
As a matter of record, the Americans were not particularly successful in promoting 
their ideas and influence in the Pacific-Asia region.  They did not handle the affair 
of the Twenty-one Demands in 1915 with any great assurance, and it was left to 
Britain to play the major outside role in resolving the affair. They had to accept the 
secret treaties in the Far East involving the major imperialist powers, and in fact 
showed a willingness to play along with that diplomacy with the 1917 Lansing-Ishii 
Agreement. They were not able to dominate Allied policy-making over the 
question of intervention in Siberia in 1918, and at Paris, they were unsuccessful 
on issues such as Shantung and the future of various Pacific islands. 
 
It was left to Wilson’s successor, Warren Harding, and his Secretary of State, 
Charles Evans Hughes, to achieve the greatest success so far in pushing 
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American ideas and leadership in the Pacific-Asia region, at the Washington 
Conference in 1921-1922. 
 
American Hegemony and the Alliance, 1902-1922 
There are a number of major issues that need to be addressed in trying to assess 
what impact the formation of American hegemony had on the Alliance: 
 
(i) The souring of American-Japanese relations in the early years of the  
century. 
 
• This process initially had little to do with the Alliance, concluded in 1902. 
Relations between Japan and the United States were becoming strained 
and edgy before that date over such issues as the Japanese in Hawaii, 
and a succession of problems arising from Japanese migration to 
California and the West Coast. Relations became more strained with the 
San Francisco school question in 1906. 
•  From 1905 onwards, there were indications of competing imperialisms 
in the Pacific. One such was the growing naval rivalry. Theodore 
Roosevelt decided to send the Atlantic Fleet into the Pacific in 1907, and 
early in 1908, there were a number of war scares between the 
Americans and the Japanese. The tension eased following the visit paid 
by the American fleet to Japan in the autumn of 1908 and the warm 
welcome the sailors received from the Japanese public. The British 
viewed the situation with some concern, but as Sir Edward Grey put it in 
July 1907, ‘The Americans talk angrily, but they have no means of 
getting at the Japanese unless they build a much larger fleet.’5  
• Theodore Roosevelt was willing to play a mediatorial role in the latter 
stages of the Russo-JapaneseWar, but he was not over-enthusiastic 
about the outcome: a clear, if limited, Japanese victory.  In sporting 
parlance, he would have preferred a draw. But he was willing to accept 
the new Japanese position in Korea and, by extension, in southern 
Manchuria.  He may have toyed with the idea of constructing an Anglo-
American coalition, but the Taft-Katsura exchanges of 1905 and the 
Root-Takahira note of 1908 demonstrate his realistic approach to Japan. 
 
  
• A further deterioration of American-Japanese relations occurred after 
1908. It can be argued that much of the responsibility for this can be 
placed at the door of the new Taft-Knox administration in Washington. 
There was certainly a lack of Rooseveltian realism in the new approach 
to Manchuria. American policy ran into something of a brick wall, not just 
that resulting from the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905, but also 
resulting from the agreements of 1907 which brought France and Russia 
onside. 
 
(ii) The generally amicable relations between the United States and the  
United Kingdom in the years before 1914. 
 
• Tensions between Britain and the United States, over such issues as Latin 
America and the second Anglo-Boer War lessened and faded in the early 
years of the new century. Moreover, Britain was increasingly preoccupied  
with what was happening in Europe. The possibility, however, of a much 
closer relationship, even possibly an alliance, as raised by Joseph 
Chamberlain in 1898, and initially welcomed by John Hay, was never a 
serious proposition. 
• The United Kingdom was willing to respond to the arbitration proposals 
which were made in 1910 by the United States. This must be seen against 
the background that by 1910-11, there was certainly an awareness in 
London that the Alliance with Japan was having an adverse effect on 
relations with the United States.  By 1910, Britain was becoming the target 
of resentment for its support of Japan, particularly over Manchuria.  But 
given the situation in Europe, which dominated opinion in Whitehall, the 
Alliance was more necessary than ever.  
• The question of an arbitration treaty with the United States was 
consequently a big factor in the negotiations that preceded the conclusion 
of the Third Alliance in 1911. What price the value of the Alliance now for 
Japan? The United States was appearing more and more as her most likely 
opponent in the Pacific-Asia region, and here was her ally wanting approval 
of a proposal which would mean that the revised Alliance would only work 
partially against the United States – support but short of war. 
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• The arbitration treaty, of course, lapsed in 1912, following opposition in the 
American Senate, and consequently article IV of the 1911 Alliance (the 
article providing for arbitration) did not come into effect. But what had 
happened between 1910 and 1912 was a massive blow to Japanese 
confidence in the Alliance. It was clear that Britain had no intention of going 
to the assistance of Japan, in the event of war with the United States. 
However, it was not until 1917 that Japan publicly acknowledged this. 
 
(iii) The Alliance was under increasing strain in the years 1910-1911. There 
were a number of issues, most of which had little direct relationship to the 
United States but rather, were Anglo-Japanese issues. 
 
• There was growing unease, and indeed in some cases, hostility, to Japan 
in what might loosely be called commercial circles. It was partly because of 
Japanese  discouragement of foreign competition in the regions under its 
control, but rather more because of what was happening in the negotiations 
for a new Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty in 1910-11. 
•  While the United Kingdom was willing to accept what Japan was doing in 
Korea and southern Manchuria, problems arose with Japanese policy south 
of the Wall, particularly over the Yangtse region by 1912-13. There was a 
clash of imperialisms.  
• There was a gap in the two countries in their perception of what was 
happening in China with the Revolution of 1911-12 and after. Japan had no 
great regard for Yuan Shih-K’ai (shades of 1894-95), and arguably was 
out-manoeuvred by the British and Yuan in 1911-12. The two countries 
also differed in their perspectives on what happened in 1913. 
• There was growing anti-Japanese feeling in the Empire. The dislike of 
Japan, which was particularly marked in Canada and Australia, was partly 
because of suspicions of Japanese naval developments and possible 
imperialist ambitions in the Pacific, and more because of racial hostility to 
Japan.  
• By 1914, influential political and  military groups in Japan were beginning to 
question the value of the Alliance. The attractions of an alternative German 
road, or possibly even a Russian one, were being aired.  
 
 (iv) World War One created a number of problems for the Alliance. Overall, it 
worked well, and, it can be argued, was a significant factor in the final 
victory in 1918. Throughout, the American factor was not particularly 
important. 
 
• The strategic importance of the Alliance was demonstrated at the very 
beginning of hostilities in 1914, although London did have mixed feelings 
about Japanese entry into the war. Japan took advantage of the war to 
present China with the Twenty-one Demands in January 1915. Whatever 
reservations Britain had about the Demands - especially Groups III and V -
she wished to avoid any prospect of a Sino-Japanese war, and in May, Sir 
Edward Grey offered British mediation in order to secure agreement 
between Peking and Tokyo. 
• Germany put out peace feelers to Japan in 1915, 1916, and 1917. The 
nightmare scenario in London was that Japan might leave the war and 
make a separate peace, or, even worse, change sides. 1941 might have 
happened, in a modified form, twenty-five years earlier. The record shows 
that Japan remained faithful to the Alliance.  
• The Russian Revolution of 1917, the collapse of Russia and the ensuing 
Civil War, led to a mix of agreement and disagreement between Tokyo and 
London as to how to respond. Both behaved as imperialist powers, the 
Japanese in Siberia, the British in Siberia, Central Asia, and the Caspian 
region.   
• Both parties to the Alliance took advantage of the war to pursue their own 
ambitions, Japan regionally, Britain globally. There were clashes over 
China, the German Pacific islands and Siberia, but the Alliance worked. 
• There is little evidence of an American hegemonic approach to the Alliance, 
or indeed to the problems of the Pacific and East Asia between 1914 and 
1918. The United States, despite not being involved in the world war, 
played a minor role in the Sino-Japanese crisis in 1915. It objected to the 
secret diplomacy which was such a feature of the period, and to what was 
happening in Siberia from 1918 onwards. But it also played along with that 
secret diplomacy with the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917. 
 
(v) What happened at the Peace Conference of 1919?  The diplomacy of  
 peace- making was not a great triumph for the Alliance, but the differences 
between the United Kingdom and Japan owed little to American influence 
and pressure. 
 
• The United States unveiled what might be called its blueprint for 
international relations at the Paris Peace Conference. The international 
mood appeared to be supportive; the results, as expressed in the terms of 
the various treaties, were at best mixed. Point One of Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points talked of ‘Open covenants of peace openly arrived at’ but 
the peacemakers were forced to accept the results of secret diplomacy in 
the Middle East, Europe and Asia.  
• The peace negotiations and the resulting settlement did little to strengthen 
the  Alliance.  Britain was on Japan’s side on the Shantung issue, she was 
a reluctant opponent on the question of racial equality, and her attitude on 
the retention of the German Pacific islands was somewhat equivocal. If 
Japan played the role of faithful ally during the war, Britain can hardly be 
said to have reciprocated at Paris. But if the negotiations and the 
settlement did little to strengthen the Alliance, United States influence was 
a minor contributory factor. 
 
(vi) The debate over the future of the Alliance, 1919-1921, and what happened  
 at the Washington conference. 
 
• Article VI of the Third Alliance of 1911 laid down that the ‘Agreement shall 
come into effect immediately after the date of  its signature and remain in 
force for ten years from that date’. It went on to set out the procedures for 
extending or terminating the alliance after ten years. The Allies were able to 
indulge in reflection and debate in the new international environment, which 
came with the Paris Peace Conference and the setting up of the League of 
Nations, as to whether they wished to continue the Alliance as it stood, 
change it, or terminate it.  
• The process of debate over the future of the Alliance was prolonged and 
intensive, culminating in the United Kingdom with the discussions at the 
Imperial Conference in 1921. The War to end Wars had been fought and 
won, Germany was defeated, a new international order was in place and 
the Paris settlement had changed the world. Was the Anglo-Japanese 
 Alliance needed in this Brave New World? If it survived, it had to be 
changed to bring it into line with the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
• Alongside the idealism there was scepticism about the new order, 
considerable cynicism, and a good deal of hard-nosed realism.  Germany 
was gone, but there was the new global challenge of international 
communism following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.  The United States 
had opted out of the new order.  There was evidence of a deteriorating 
relationship between the United States and Japan, and one manifestation 
of this was an American-Japanese naval race. 
• There were also complications in the Empire. Canada was hostile to 
continuation of the Alliance, Australia and New Zealand wanted to maintain 
it. - The result of the lengthy period of discussion and reflection was that 
both Japan and the United Kingdom appeared to want to maintain the 
Alliance, albeit in an amended form to bring it into line with the new 
obligations incurred under the Covenant of the League. What becomes 
clear with the advantage of hindsight is that behind the scenes in all this 
lengthy process of discussion and reflection was the brooding presence of 
the United States. 
• The denouement came at the Washington Conference in 1921-1922, and 
can be seen as a considerable triumph for American policy.  The Alliance 
was not renewed, even in an amended form, but was replaced by the 
innocuous Four Power Pact.  The Nine Power Treaty laid down, at least in 
theory, a new approach to China.  The Naval Limitation agreement gave 
the United States much of what it wanted. 
• Washington follows on from Paris. Both can be seen as attempts to impose 
a United States view on the international situation – global at Paris, 
regional at Washington. From the perspective of the United States, 
Washington, while more limited, was the more successful. But the success 
was short term. By the 1930s, the Washington arrangements were 
contributing to a longer term disaster. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
There is little to add by way of conclusion, other than to underline some of the 
points which have been explored earlier in the paper. 
  
The Alliance was under pressure from 1910 onwards. The main reasons for this 
pressure had little or nothing to do in the early stages with any American view of 
the Pacific-Asia region. It was about commercial issues, differing perspectives on 
events in China, unease within the British Empire, and something of a clash of 
imperialisms over China. But the Alliance was renewed in 1911; it continued to 
work, it was the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy and a very important 
buttress of British foreign policy, it delivered in the First World War, and both Allies 
accepted the case for further renewal in 1921. 
 
The United Kingdom’s attitude and commitment to the Alliance were always more 
affected by American policies and criticism than were those of Japan. Moreover, 
Britain was closer to the United States on issues such as arbitration, and the 
Open Door in China. However, there could be no real questioning of the Alliance 
until after the transformation of the European scene that followed the defeat of 
Germany. 
 
The beginnings of serious United States hostility to the Alliance go back to soon 
after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War and the signature of the Second 
Alliance in 1905. There were fundamental difference of opinion and policy 
between Japan and the United States as to what should happen in the Pacific-
Asia region. The American view clashed with that of Japan. The United States 
saw the Alliance as a bulwark protecting Japan, and, more than that, as 
encouraging Japan. Whatever the issues that separated the countries after 1905 
– from railways in Manchuria, differing approaches to China, the future of the 
Pacific islands, intervention in Siberia, the resolution of the Shantung question, 
the developing naval race – the United States saw, alongside Japan, the United 
Kingdom, standing shoulder to shoulder. 
 
Although there was a long way to go, the beginnings of an American hegemonic 
approach to the Pacific-Asia region can be seen in the years before 1921, and the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was identified as an obstacle to that approach. American 
opposition to the Alliance had a limited effect before 1918; by 1921, it can be seen 
as the most important factor in the destruction of the Alliance. 
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 THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 
 
Ian Nish 
 
 
The historical significance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance has to be measured in two 
dimensions: for the countries directly involved; and internationally. For Japan, the 
alliance was overwhelmingly beneficial, giving her great power status from 1902. For 
Britain also, it had its benefits. As Julian Corbett, her great naval historian, wrote: the 
alliance 'gave Britain respite from having to defend everything everywhere'. 
Internationally the alliance was more mixed in its benefits. It failed in its professed 
long-term objectives: to give peace in the 'Extreme East' (though the Russo-
Japanese war was the only serious exception); and to maintain the independence 
and territorial integrity for China and Korea. 
 
The alliance lasted for almost the first quarter of the twentieth century. It consisted of 
three separate and distinct treaties. The original alliance treaty was a great leap in 
the dark, especially for Britain where it was a leap from isolation which by 1902 could 
no longer be described as 'splendid'. The British cabinet was nervous about its 
conclusion. There were doubts and divisions too on the Japanese side. But these 
were resolved by the important keynote speech which Prince Ito Hirobumi made at 
the Mansion House, London, on 4 January 1902 in which he expressed the sincere 
hope that 'the friendly feelings which have existed between us in the past shall be 
daily more strongly cemented in the near future.' This coded message surely implied 
that his opposition to the alliance in the past had been publicly removed.1  
 
When the mantle of secrecy was withdrawn and the alliance was published on 12 
February, there was great joy in Japan. The students of Keio University staged a 
candlelight procession through Minato-ku from 1800 to 2200 hours on the following 
day. 1500 officials and students surged through the main gate and marched with 
lanterns (kantera) to Shiba Park, thence to Hamamatsu-cho, Shimbashi and 
Nihonbashi. At Nijubashi, they shouted Banzai to the emperor. Leaving 
Sakuradamon, they moved to the British legation and cried Banzai to the British 
minister. Thence to the Gaimusho, Toranomon, and finally past Ikura back to the 
campus. 
As the students went along they sang a song which I shall try to translate.  
  
 'Japan where the morning sun rises and Britain where the sun never sets have 
hitherto stood apart in east and west. Today when an alliance is reached 
between them is a time of great celebration and raises the flag for world 
peace. 
 
 The objective of the two countries in linking hands is to help China and Korea 
and create a paradise of peace in the orient. It is a courageous spirit to show 
the world [tenchi] a compact of which we do not feel ashamed.  
 
 We who were born in this ancient land of Japan and grew up during the reign 
of Meiji have received blessings greater than our ancestors. When this news 
came to our ears, we joyfully blessed the emperor anew. 
 
 Our two empires founded on independence and self-esteem [dokuritsu jison] 
have published this alliance before the eyes of the nations and have nothing 
to fear again. Such a bold action confirms our independence and self-esteem.' 
2 
 
Student songs are not regarded as first-class historical sources, certainly not in UK 
university circles. British students did not take to the streets for the alliance. The Keio 
song, however, is interesting for several reasons: there is no mention of a smaller 
power joining a major one, they see it as a compact between equals; there is a 
strong emphasis on peace; they stress the need for protecting China and Korea, 
presumably from Russia (which is not mentioned). All the Japanese dailies deployed 
similar liberal arguments in the great space they devoted to it after the publication of 
the alliance. By contrast, the British dailies hardly mentioned it at all, a relief for the 
government of the day which feared an unfavourable press reaction. 
 
The second treaty of 1905 which was probably the strongest of the three alliances 
and conferred most advantages on the signatories, including an explicit undertaking 
by Britain to aid Japan if Russia tried to fight a war of revenge. That of course never 
materialized. The Japanese were asked to send troops to India in an emergency. But 
it was soon recognized in Britain that the Japanese should not be drawn into India's 
defence problems; and the clause was in effect removed. The treaty must be judged 
a relative success insofar as it deterred any Russian idea of revenge. But please 
note that, if it induced Russia to give up her territorial ambitions in Manchuria and 
Korea, it did not deter Russia from an expansive policy in central Asia and Persia 
and, in spite of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907, the Russians were active there 
right down to 1914 and continued to present a threat to British India.  
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The historical significance of the 1905 alliance treaty is that it led the way to the 
cluster of treaties entered into in 1907. That was the year when Japan came into 
convergence with Europe or rather with European colonial empires by entering into 
the Franco-Japanese treaty and the various Russo-Japanese treaties. It was one of 
the most important stages in Japan's diplomatic development in the 20th century; 
and the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the agent for it.3  
 
The weakest of the three treaties was that of 1911 which was fundamentally different 
in character. Because Japan and Russia made up their differences in East Asia after 
the Asian treaties of 1907, there was less focus for the alliance. And yet it lasted 
longest and had to respond to many of the critical events of the day: China's 
Revolution of 1911, the European war of 1914-18, the Bolshevik Revolution and the 
Paris Peace conference. The alliance was not directly involved in these but was 
subtly modified by each of them. 4  
 
There were disappointments and dissatisfactions on both sides in the Anglo-
Japanese alliance. In the case of Britain, the question of not renewing it was 
discussed in 1911 but not pursued. Ambassador Sir Claude MacDonald, a strong 
Japanophile, did not recommend renewal or at least urged against premature 
renewal. His argument was that 'the next few years are of vital importance to Japan 
and her policy in Corea, Manchuria and China' and her actions during those years 
'will be a valuable indication to us whether we should renew the alliance'. London, 
however, went ahead because of global considerations, namely the importance of 
the American relationship. 5  
 
For its last 13 years the alliance was in decline. This deterioration should not be a 
matter of surprise or shame. There is inevitably a falling away from the excitement of 
entering a new relationship; and mundane disputes arise over trade and territory 
which an alliance brings in its train. We now know that the Elder Statesmen in Japan 
were privately sceptical of the British alliance especially after the European war 
began and thought that Japan should broaden the range of her contacts.6  But the 
governments of the day continued to observe the traditional policy that the alliance 
was the mainstay of Japan's foreign policy. 
 
 40
The question is how far the two allies tried to improve the deteriorating relationship 
between them. Britain which was in a weak position after 1914 needed Japan's 
goodwill more than Japan needed Britain's goodwill. She took some steps to improve 
the relationship, valid steps but not very inspired ones, such as the  treaties 
regarding the peace conference (1917), the military mission to present a Field 
Marshal's baton to Emperor Taisho, and the publication in Tokyo of the Anglo-
Japanese journal, New East, under the editorship of JW Robertson-Scott. Japan too 
did her bit to reverse the decline in the relationship by sending battleships to the 
Mediterranean, by sending orange marmalade to troops on the western front and the 
mission of Prince Higashi-Fushimi with General Shiba, GCVO, to Britain in 1918. But 
the fact was that the Japanese generals' views on Britain as a military nation were 
very negative.7 Britain's minister, Beilby Alston, also reported his disappointment that 
Japanese intellectuals were not impressed with the allied cause during the war. This 
was not directly a reflection on the British alliance though in effect it was so.8  But the 
most important step to reverse the decline in the alliance was the outcome of the war 
in Europe. Germany's defeat and the scuttling of the German navy at Scapa Flow 
altered Japan's attitude favourably. 
 
At the same time the situation had radically changed. Japan from being in 1914 a 
debtor country with an adverse trade balance and suffering from depression of its 
commerce and industry found herself four years later with her foreign debt greatly 
reduced and satisfactory trade balances. When the conclusion of an armistice came 
unexpectedly early for Japan, it was unsettling for the economy and put an end to 
much of her wartime prosperity. It would have suited Japan well for the war to 
continue. Meanwhile the turmoil of war had undermined the established position of 
Britain's manufacturers and exporters and ended London's position as a global 
financial centre.9   
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Another outcome of the war was the revelation that the United States, by reason of 
her vast resources, had the capacity to become a most formidable military power at 
short notice. During the war years the US had shown a growing dislike of Japan's 
activities in the Asia-Pacific sphere to which the countries of Europe had turned a 
blind eye. So the comparatively relaxed attitude which the Japanese government had 
earlier taken had to be re-thought at the end of the war. The American-Japanese 
disagreements which arose during the allied expedition to Siberia and the delicate 
immigration disputes led to a further deterioration.  
 
Bringing alliances to an end is never easy and it is sometimes easier to let them 
continue than to terminate them. The two options - axe it or let it drift - are equally 
unsatisfactory. Most of the prewar alliances ended automatically in the turmoil of war 
and peace. But the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a victors' alliance and advanced 
uninterruptedly but uneasily into the new world of so-called Open Diplomacy, though 
its contents were never really secret.  
 
There was also the question of compatibility between it and the covenant of the 
League of Nations. This led to big internal splits on both sides. British Foreign Office 
bureaucrats through a specially appointed committee by and large accepted this 
incompatibility and saw no alternative to its termination. The Head of the Far Eastern 
Department expressed his conclusion that the alliance could not be continued in its 
present form. He considered it to be 'an unnatural and artificial compact based 
neither on identity of interest nor on sympathy with common aims and ideals'.10 The 
committee were swayed by the majority of the Empire/Commonwealth who were 
thought to be hostile, wrongly as it proved. And the Chinese who could not be 
alienated now that Britain wanted to reestablish her commercial position in the east 
were noisy in opposition to it. But the politicians, Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary 
Curzon, did not accept these views and were in favour in June 1921 of the alliance 
being renewed - or at least revised and continued in some form. 11  
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There was a split too on the Japanese side. Oddly enough, Alston reported that 
Japan's League of Nations Association to which so many academics subscribed 
would not allow the Japanese government to renew the alliance. But Prime Minister 
Hara confirmed that, even if the effectiveness of the alliance is more limited after the 
League of Nations comes into being, its continuation is a necessity. Eventually a 
consensus was reached between the politicians of the Gaiko Chosakai and the 
military party: they wanted the alliance to continue and other powers to mind their 
own business. But Japan wanted above all that the alliance issue should not be 
considered in public forum and, in considering whether to accept the American 
invitation to attend the Washington conference, tried to get concessions from the US 
to that effect. 12   
 
In the last weeks before the Washington Conference finally opened in November 
1921, agonising uncertainty prevailed in the two allied capitals. They were conscious 
that the alliance was crumbling. In both allies a spirit of wishful thinking set in: could 
we not water down the alliance and invite Washington to join? This was the optimum 
mandate which both the British and Japanese delegates carried with them. It was 
easier than voluntarily renouncing the alliance treaties. But the likelihood that a 
formula could be  devised whereby the US would join the group was small. It was 
ruled out of order in informal parleys before the proceedings began. The four-power 
treaty which was signed on 13 December 1921, laid down that the alliance would 
come to an end with the exchange of ratifications. 13  
 
Some alliances come to an end suddenly; others linger on for years and lapse. The 
Anglo-Japanese alliance falls into the latter category. This was because there was 
considerable delay in the coming into force of the conference treaties. Ratification 
was finally accepted by the US Senate at the end of 1922 with the reservation that 
'the four-power pact contains no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no 
obligation to join in any defense'. There were yet further delays because of some 
expected reservations on the part of France. The technical ending of the 1911 treaty 
came about when the ratification of the various Washington treaties by the signatory 
powers was completed and the documents were exchanged in July 1923.14   
 
 In summing up the alliance, it may be said that in general Britain and Japan were 
imperial powers operating the diplomacy of imperialism in its heighday. But there was 
certainly in the first alliance a moral element calling for the independence and 
territorial integrity of China and Korea, what might be called 'Open Door doctrine'. 
This feature accounts for the favour shown by the US towards it. But this element 
was gradually whittled down in the second and third treaties of 1905 and 1911. So 
far as Japan was concerned, it was the strategic objective - the defense of her 
territories against threat - that was paramount and by that criterion the 1911 treaty 
was a disappointment. It gave her no guarantee of British military/naval assistance. 
Britain too had her strategic objectives: before 1907 she was antagonistic, and 
militarily vulnerable, to Russia in Asia and even after 1907 she was still suspicious 
until the end of the alliance. But, because Britain's imperial power depended on the 
Royal Navy, that meant that the level of naval strength she maintained was vital. 
That raised financial considerations and, by extension, party political issues. So the 
naval protection given by Japan was throughout the alliance period important for 
Britain. There was some truth in Japan's claim that she was Britain's policeman, the 
custodian of Britain's interests, in the east.  
 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance was historically significant because it lasted almost a 
quarter of a century, over-arching the period from 1895 to the mid-1920s. In terms of 
longevity, it compares relatively well with the great nineteenth century alliances: the 
Dual and Triple Alliances of Bismarck (1882-1918) and the Franco-Russian Alliance 
(1893-1917). But, like the 'special relationship' which is currently supposed to exist 
between Britain and the US, it was dogged by minor disagreements which were 
generally not in the public domain. Yet it survived because of the intangible security 
considerations mentioned above and the image of modest collaboration between 
monarchical states which it projected to the world.  
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